Email authentication check

doe.gov

This check reviews the domain's email authentication setup to help protect against spoofing and phishing.

All data is public, sourced from DNS Last checked about 18 hours ago
Needs attention

doe.gov has email authentication in place, with important improvements still available.

doe.gov has strong outbound authentication. Adding inbound transport security would complete the picture.

85 out of 110
2 of 4 checks passed
DMARC 50 / 50 · Passed SPF 30 / 30 · Passed BIMI 5 / 20 · Failed TLS 0 / 10 · Optional
Last checked about 18 hours ago
Compare with other domains

DMARC

Passed

Domain-based Message Authentication

50 / 50

Strict reject policy enforced

DMARC record is valid and configured correctly.

_dmarc.doe.gov TXT
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; fo=1; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=r; rf=afrf; ri=86400; rua=mailto:[email protected],mailto:[email protected]; ruf=mailto:[email protected],mailto:[email protected]

Score breakdown

  • DMARC record published +10
  • Syntax valid +5
  • Reject policy (maximum protection) +20
  • Aggregate reporting (rua) configured and verified +10
  • Failure reporting (ruf) configured +5

Configuration

Policy (p)
reject
DKIM alignment (adkim)
Relaxed (r)
SPF alignment (aspf)
Relaxed (r)
Subdomain policy (sp)
reject
Failure reporting (fo)
1

Reporting (RUA / RUF)

Aggregate reports Passed
mailto:[email protected],mailto:[email protected]
External domain verification successful
Failure reports Passed
mailto:[email protected],mailto:[email protected]
External domain verification successful
RFC 9989 note on p=reject
RFC 9989 cautions against p=reject for domains whose users post to mailing lists, and §7.4 requires receivers to treat p=reject as p=quarantine unless their own analysis justifies rejecting. For transactional or marketing-only domains, p=reject stays appropriate; mailbox domains should consider p=quarantine with sp=reject on non-sending subdomains.
Record uses tags removed by RFC 9989
RFC 9989 (May 2026) removed the pct tag. Use t=y for staged rollouts instead. RFC 9989 (May 2026) removed the rf tag. Only one format (afrf) was ever defined. RFC 9989 (May 2026) removed the ri tag. Receivers send aggregate reports daily regardless.

SPF

Passed

Sender Policy Framework

30 / 30

Hard-fail policy, within lookup limits

SPF record is valid and complies with RFC 7208.

doe.gov TXT
v=spf1 include:_spf.doe.gov -all

Score breakdown

  • SPF record published +10
  • Syntax valid +5
  • Hard fail policy (-all) +10
  • No configuration warnings +5

Configuration

Default policy
-all (hard fail)
DNS lookups
3 / 10 max
Void lookups
0 / 2 max
Syntax check
OK

DNS lookup detail

Each mechanism that may trigger a DNS query at delivery time.

1 include: _spf.doe.gov Valid

SPF record found

v=spf1 ip4:205.254.128.0/28 ip4:205.167.107.0/28 ip6:2607:f368:1000:1102::/64 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-002bc302.gpphosted.com -all

Processed recursively per RFC 7208

2 include: spf.protection.outlook.com Valid

SPF record found

v=spf1 ip4:40.92.0.0/15 ip4:40.107.0.0/16 ip4:52.100.0.0/15 ip4:52.102.0.0/16 ip4:52.103.0.0/17 ip4:104.47.0.0/17 ip6:2a01:111:f400::/48 ip6:2a01:111:f403::/49 ip6:2a01:111:f403:8000::/51 ip6:2a01:111:f403:c000::/51 ip6:2a01:111:f403:f000::/52 -all

Processed recursively per RFC 7208

3 include: spf-002bc302.gpphosted.com Valid

SPF record found

v=spf1 ip4:67.231.155.102 ip4:67.231.147.102 ip6:2620:100:9004:21:67:231:155:102 ip6:2620:100:9000:21:67:231:147:102

Processed recursively per RFC 7208

Authorized IP addresses

include:_spf.doe.gov

205.254.128.0/28 205.167.107.0/28 2607:f368:1000:1102::/64

This record also contains

include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf-002bc302.gpphosted.com

include:spf.protection.outlook.com

40.92.0.0/15 40.107.0.0/16 52.100.0.0/15 52.102.0.0/16 52.103.0.0/17 104.47.0.0/17 2a01:111:f400::/48 2a01:111:f403::/49 2a01:111:f403:8000::/51 2a01:111:f403:c000::/51 2a01:111:f403:f000::/52

include:spf-002bc302.gpphosted.com

67.231.155.102 67.231.147.102 2620:100:9004:21:67:231:155:102 2620:100:9000:21:67:231:147:102

BIMI

Failed

Brand Indicators for Message Identification

5 / 20

BIMI record has configuration errors

BIMI record must start with 'v=BIMI1'.

Score breakdown

  • BIMI record published +5
  • BIMI record valid 0 / 5
  • Logo URL accessible and valid SVG 0 / 5
  • No VMC certificate configured (optional) 0 / 5

Configuration

Logo (l)
Not configured
Mark certificate (a)
Not configured
Selector
default
Note
SVG content is not parsed, for safety

TLS

Optional

Transport security · MTA-STS & TLS-RPT

0 / 10

Inbound transport protection not fully configured

MTA-STS and TLS-RPT are optional, but they protect inbound mail against transport downgrade attacks and give visibility into TLS delivery failures.

Score breakdown

  • TLS-RPT record configured (optional) 0 / 5
  • MTA-STS policy configured (optional) 0 / 5

Configuration

TLS-RPT
Not configured
MTA-STS
Not configured

Transport checks

TLS-RPT (reporting) Not configured

No TLS-RPT record found.

MTA-STS (policy) Not configured

No MTA-STS record found.

Protect inbound transport

Receiver Shield helps deploy, monitor, and safely enforce MTA-STS and TLS-RPT for doe.gov.

Start monitoring

doe.gov enforces a strict DMARC reject policy, instructing receivers to block unauthenticated emails. SPF is correctly configured with a strict policy (-all), specifying which servers may send on its behalf. A few improvements would strengthen doe.gov's email authentication posture.

Keep doe.gov protected automatically

This check is a snapshot. DNS records drift when providers change, teams edit records, or unauthorized changes slip in. DMARCTrust watches the same authentication layer continuously and tells you when something moves.

DMARC report processing

Aggregate and failure DMARC reports are received, parsed, and turned into sender visibility without manual XML handling.

DNS change alerts

DNS checks run every 5 minutes for monitored domains, with email alerts when DMARC, SPF, BIMI, TLS-RPT, or MTA-STS records change.

Receiver Shield for inbound

Deploy, host, and safely enforce MTA-STS and TLS-RPT when this checker finds an inbound transport gap.

Start monitoring doe.gov View plans First checked 6 months ago

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How other domains configure email authentication

Showing domains checked by our users. All data is from public DNS records.

Popular domains

Frequently checked

Well configured

Reject policy + valid SPF

Same policy

Also using reject

What we check

DMARC policy and alignment, SPF record and includes, BIMI logo and certificate, and inbound transport security with MTA-STS and TLS-RPT.

Why it matters

Healthy authentication improves delivery and blocks spoofing. Major inbox providers increasingly expect DMARC and aligned SPF or DKIM from senders.

What you get

Syntax, policy, reporting validation, include analysis, alignment interpretation, and clear setup guidance for every result.