Email authentication check

kristyk.ca

This check reviews the domain's email authentication setup to help protect against spoofing and phishing.

All data is public, sourced from DNS Last checked about 16 hours ago
Needs attention

kristyk.ca has email authentication in place, with important improvements still available.

kristyk.ca has strong outbound authentication. Adding inbound transport security would complete the picture.

80 out of 110
2 of 4 checks passed
DMARC 50 / 50 · Passed SPF 30 / 30 · Passed BIMI 0 / 20 · Optional TLS 0 / 10 · Optional
Last checked about 16 hours ago
Compare with other domains

DMARC

Passed

Domain-based Message Authentication

50 / 50

Strict reject policy enforced

DMARC record is valid and configured correctly.

_dmarc.kristyk.ca TXT
v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:[email protected]; ruf=mailto:[email protected]; adkim=r; aspf=r; rf=afrf

Score breakdown

  • DMARC record published +10
  • Syntax valid +5
  • Reject policy (maximum protection) +20
  • Aggregate reporting (rua) configured and verified +10
  • Failure reporting (ruf) configured +5

Configuration

Policy (p)
reject
DKIM alignment (adkim)
Relaxed (r)
SPF alignment (aspf)
Relaxed (r)
Subdomain policy (sp)
Inherits p=reject
Failure reporting (fo)
1

Reporting (RUA / RUF)

Aggregate reports Passed
mailto:[email protected]
External domain verification successful
Failure reports Passed
mailto:[email protected]
External domain verification successful
RFC 9989 note on p=reject
RFC 9989 cautions against p=reject for domains whose users post to mailing lists, and §7.4 requires receivers to treat p=reject as p=quarantine unless their own analysis justifies rejecting. For transactional or marketing-only domains, p=reject stays appropriate; mailbox domains should consider p=quarantine with sp=reject on non-sending subdomains.
Record uses tags removed by RFC 9989
RFC 9989 (May 2026) removed the rf tag. Only one format (afrf) was ever defined.

SPF

Passed

Sender Policy Framework

30 / 30

Hard-fail policy, within lookup limits

SPF record is valid and complies with RFC 7208.

kristyk.ca TXT
v=spf1 redirect=_spf.kristyk.ca

Score breakdown

  • SPF record published +10
  • Syntax valid +5
  • Hard fail policy (-all) via redirect +10
  • No configuration warnings +5

Configuration

Default policy
-all (hard fail)
DNS lookups
3 / 10 max
Void lookups
2 / 2 max
Syntax check
OK
Redirect
_spf.kristyk.ca

SPF redirect

valid

redirect=_spf.kristyk.ca

Effective policy: -all

DNS lookup detail

Each mechanism that may trigger a DNS query at delivery time.

1 redirect: _spf.kristyk.ca Valid

Valid SPF record found at redirect target

v=spf1 ip4:158.69.210.17 ip4:158.69.4.252 a mx -all
2 a: _spf.kristyk.ca Resolved

A/AAAA records found: 0

3 mx: _spf.kristyk.ca Not found

No MX records found

Authorized IP addresses

include:_spf.kristyk.ca

158.69.210.17 158.69.4.252

BIMI

Optional

Brand Indicators for Message Identification

0 / 20

No BIMI record published

No BIMI record found for selector 'default'.

Score breakdown

  • BIMI record published (optional) 0 / 5

Configuration

Logo (l)
Not configured
Mark certificate (a)
Not configured
Selector
default
Note
SVG content is not parsed, for safety
BIMI is optional
BIMI usually matters after DMARC enforcement is working. Use it for brand display, not as a replacement for SPF or DMARC.

TLS

Optional

Transport security · MTA-STS & TLS-RPT

0 / 10

Inbound transport protection not fully configured

MTA-STS and TLS-RPT are optional, but they protect inbound mail against transport downgrade attacks and give visibility into TLS delivery failures.

Score breakdown

  • TLS-RPT record configured (optional) 0 / 5
  • MTA-STS policy configured (optional) 0 / 5

Configuration

TLS-RPT
Not configured
MTA-STS
Not configured

Transport checks

TLS-RPT (reporting) Not configured

No TLS-RPT record found.

MTA-STS (policy) Not configured

No MTA-STS record found.

Protect inbound transport

Receiver Shield helps deploy, monitor, and safely enforce MTA-STS and TLS-RPT for kristyk.ca.

Start monitoring

kristyk.ca enforces a strict DMARC reject policy, instructing receivers to block unauthenticated emails. SPF is correctly configured with a strict policy (-all), specifying which servers may send on its behalf. A few improvements would strengthen kristyk.ca's email authentication posture.

Keep kristyk.ca protected automatically

This check is a snapshot. DNS records drift when providers change, teams edit records, or unauthorized changes slip in. DMARCTrust watches the same authentication layer continuously and tells you when something moves.

DMARC report processing

Aggregate and failure DMARC reports are received, parsed, and turned into sender visibility without manual XML handling.

DNS change alerts

DNS checks run every 5 minutes for monitored domains, with email alerts when DMARC, SPF, BIMI, TLS-RPT, or MTA-STS records change.

Receiver Shield for inbound

Deploy, host, and safely enforce MTA-STS and TLS-RPT when this checker finds an inbound transport gap.

Start monitoring kristyk.ca View plans First checked about 1 month ago

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How other domains configure email authentication

Showing domains checked by our users. All data is from public DNS records.

Popular domains

Frequently checked

Well configured

Reject policy + valid SPF

Same policy

Also using reject

What we check

DMARC policy and alignment, SPF record and includes, BIMI logo and certificate, and inbound transport security with MTA-STS and TLS-RPT.

Why it matters

Healthy authentication improves delivery and blocks spoofing. Major inbox providers increasingly expect DMARC and aligned SPF or DKIM from senders.

What you get

Syntax, policy, reporting validation, include analysis, alignment interpretation, and clear setup guidance for every result.